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THE MEASURE OF RECOVERY WHERE THE
PLAINTIFF HAS PARTIALLY PERFORMED A
CONTRACT AND COMPLETE PERFORMANCE
IS PREVENTED BY THE DEFENDANT'S
BREACH
In a recent bar examination the following question was
propounded: The Daily Evening Sun, a newspaper pub-
lished in the City of Z., entered into a contract with the
Park Moving Picture Theatre to run some advertising mat-
ter for the latter in at least twenty inches of space each week
during the year, beginning September 10, 1918. The manager
of the Park Theatre was to furnish a copy for publication
subject to the approval or revision of the editorial depart-
ment of the Daily Sun, and agreed to pay for its publication
at the rate of 13y 2 c per line daily, payable before the tenth
day of each month. The contract recited that this special
rate was a reduced rate in consideration of the defendant
agreeing to advertise for a period of one year. On March
28, 1919, the manager of the Park Theatre refused to fur-
nish more copy (the original provision being that the pub-
lication of the last copy "shall continue until new copy is
given"), claiming he wanted to terminate the agreement, and
refused to pay for any insertion after March 28, 1919. The
Daily Sun brought an action in municipal court, asking for
a judgment on the basis of 25c per line, which was the rate
for a short term, or monthly rate, for insertions made prior
to March 28, 1919. The case was tried before a jury, and
verdict, rendered for the plaintiff on the basis of 25c per
line; this judgment was reversed by the Court of Appeals.
It is now before the Supreme Court. What should the court
hold? Why?
This question calls for a discussion of the measure of the
plaintiff's damages when the defendant has breached the
contract and the plaintiff sues in quantum meruit to recover
the value of his part performance. Should the plaintiff re-
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cover the reasonable market value of what he has done or
should he be restricted to the rate stipulated in the contract?
A glance at the hypothetical question shows that the prob-
lem is vitally important. If the Daily Sun is permitted to re-
cover the reasonable value of its services it will recover at
a rate which is nearly double the contract rate. The sum
recovered for part performance will be greater than the sum
which could have been recovered for full performance.
The case of Doolittle & Chamberlain v. McCullough' is
the leading authority which denies the plaintiff's right to re-
cover the reasonable value of his partial performance of a
contract which has been breached by the defendant. There
the plaintiff had agreed to make certain excavations 'for a
railroad bed at eleven cents per -cubic yard. After the work
was partly done the defendant breached the contract and
the plaintiff sued in quantum meruit to recover twenty cents
per yard which was the reasonable value of the work done.
The Ohio court, in a vehement opinion, denied recovery,
saying:
"The price having been determined and mutually agreed upon ...
neither of the parties can vary the price so fixed by the contract. Nor,
as to the price of the services actually rendered under the contract
while in force between the parties, can it avail the plaintiff ... that
since the rendering of the services, the defendant has put an end to the
special contract. The fact would still remain that the services were
rendered under a special contract, and at the price agreed upon, and
expressed by the parties."
This holding, although contrary to the weight of authority,
is followed in Indiana,2 Washington," New Jersey ' and
Illinois.'
The Ohio court itself has placed serious restrictions upon
the operation of the rule. In Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin
Paper Co.' it permitted the recovery of the reasonable value
1 12 Ohio St. 360 (1861).
2 Hoyle v. Stellwagen, 28 Ind. App. 681, 63 N. E. 780 (1902).
3 Noyes v. Pugin, 2 Wash. 653, 27 Pac. 548 (1891).
4 Kehoe v. Rutherford, 56 N. J. L. 23, 27 Atl. 912 (1893).
5 City of Chicago v. Sexton, 115 Ill. 230, 2 N. E. 263 (1880).
6 57 Ohio St. 182, 48 N. E. 888 (1897).
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of part performance in quantum meruit. There the Coal
Company agreed to furnish the defendant with all of the
coal he would use for a year at the rate of $1.90 per ton. The
defendant, after accepting the coal during the fall and win-
ter months when the market price was high, breached the
contract. The court held that the rule laid down in Doolittle
& Chamberlain v. McCullough was correct if limited to the
cases in which the plaintiff has a losing contract but where
the plaintiff has a valuable contract justice required that he
be allowed to recover the reasonable value of what he has
done. This distinction is unsound because in all cases where
the plaintiff desires the reasonable value of his services he
has a losing contract. Unless the reasonable value is more
than the contract value he will not desire the reasonable
value and if the reasonable value is more than the contract
value the plaintiff has a losing contract. If the Ohio court
would follow its rule to its logical conclusion it would never
allow the plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of his
services where there is an express contract.
This minority rule which denies the right to recover the
reasonable value is based upon the theory that the effect
of a breach by the defendant is not to deprive him of all
rights which he lhas under the contract. Even if he is guilty
of breaching the express contract he has a right to have the
damages which he must pay the plaintiff measured by the
prices agreed upon in the contract. The substance of this
argument is succinctly stated in Cleveland, etc., Ry. Co. v.
Moore,' an Indiana case:
... the fact that the contract has been violated by the defendant
does not authorize the plaintiff to recover under a quantum meruit
for work comprehended within, and done under, the special contract,
in excess of the price which the contract fixes as the compensation
for the doing of such work."
Obviously the Indiana court thinks that the mere fact that
the defendant is guilty of breaching the contract does not
7 82 N. E. 52, 57 (Ind: 1907) petition for rehearing overruled, 84 N. E. 540
(1908).
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authorize the plaintiff to ignore the contract in estimating
the damages he has suffered as a result of the breach, but
that the damages in all instances must be measured by the
contract.
But the overwhelming weight of authority allows the
plaintiff to recover the reasonable value of his part per-
formance when the defendant has breached the contract.'
The reasons given by the courts for permitting such a re-
covery are varied and often obscure. Sometimes no reasons
whatever are given even in a case which is the leading case
in that jurisdiction. Clark v. Mayor, etc., of New York '
furnishes a good example of this situation. There the court
announced that the plaintiff might at his election sue the
defendant in quantum meruit and recover the reasonable
value of his part performance and gave no reason why they
had adopted the rule. Yet this case seems to have over-
ruled the earlier New York case of Koon v. Greenman"0
and established the present New York rule. It is cited with
approval in other jurisdictions.'
Many of the courts base their holding upon the theory
that the defendant by breaching the contract has forfeited
all of the rights he may have had under the contract and
8 Dunaway v. Roden, 14 Ala. App. 501, 71 So. 70 (1916); Eastern Arkansas
Fence Co. v. Tanner, 67 Ark. 228, 41 S. W. 763 (1897); Cox v. McLaughlin, 76
Cal. 60, 18 Pac. 100 (1888); Valente v. Weinberg, 80 Conn. 134, 67 AtI. 369
(1907); Elliott v. Wilson, 2 Boyce. (Del.) 445, 80 At. 35 (1911); Hazen v. Cobb,
117 So. 853 (Fla. 1927) ; Weeter v. Reynolds, 48 Idaho 611, 284 Pac. 257 (1930);
Draper v. Miller, 92 Kan. 695, 141 Pac. 1014 (1914); Madison-Jackson-Estill
Lumber & Development Co. v. Coyle, 166 Ky. 108, 178 S. W. 1170 (1915);
North v. Mallory, 94 Md. 305, 51 Ad. 189 (1903); Fitzgerald v. Allen, 128 Mass.
232 (1880); Kearney v. Doyle, 22 Mich. 294 (1870); McCullough v. Baker, 47
Mo. 401 (1871); Clark v. The Mayor, etc., of New York, 4 N. Y. (4 Comst.)
338, 53 Am. Dec. 379 (1850) ; Lynn v. Selby, 29 N. D. 420, 151 N. W. 31 (1915) ;
City of Philadelphia v. Tripple, 230 Pa. 480, 79 At. 703 (1911); Davis v. Brown
County Coal Co., 21 S. D. 173, 110 N. W. 113 (1906); Brady v. Oliver, 125
Tenn. 595, 147 S. W. 1135 (1913); United States v. Behan, 110 U. S. 338, 28 L.
ed. 168 (1883); Newhall Engineering Co. v. Daly, 116 Wis. 256, 93 N. W. 12
(1903).
9 Op. cit. supra note 8.
10 7 Wend. 121 (1831).
11 Wellston Coal Co. v. Franklin Paper Co., op. cit. supra note 6; McCul-
lough v. Baker, op. cit. supra note 8.
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is not entitled to insist that the damages must be measured
by the contract. Thus in Fitzgerald v. Allen 12 the court
said:
if the special contract is terminated by any means other than
the voluntary refusal of the plaintiff to perform the same upon his part,
and the defendant has actually received benefit from the labor per-
formed and materials furnished by. the plaintiff, the value of such
labor and materials may be recovered upon a count upon a quantum
meruit, in which case the actual benefit which the defendant receives
from the plaintiff is to be paid for, independently of the terms of the
contract. The'contract itself is at an end. Its stipulations are as if they
had not existed."
The reasoning in City of Philadelphia v. Tripple 13 is to the
same effect:
"Let it further be supposed, however, that the owner, who finds
himself in this position of advantage, voluntarily puts an end to his
contract rights in the premises. This in legal effect he does if he him-
self breaks the contract or discharges the builder from his obligation
to perform it .... The owner, on the other hand, has deprived him-
self of the legal right which would have sufficed to defeat the equity.
He accordingly stands defenseless in the presence of the builder's
claim."
These statements indicate that the courts regard the de-
fendant's breach to be of such serious consequence as to
effectually deprive him of all his contractual rights. He has
no right to insist that the damages be measured by the con-
tract. The loss of this right is one of the penalties of his
breach.
To hold that the defendant by breaching the contract has
deprived himself of the right to measure the damages by the
contract is to destroy the very essence of the contractual
relationship. The purpose for which the contract was made
was to define the future rights and liabilities of the parties
and to determine the obligation which each owed to the
other and the obligation which each was entitled to receive
from the other. This purpose is entirely frustrated by holding
12 Op. cit. supra note 8.
13 Op. ci. supra note 8.
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that when one party breaches the contract the obligation
which he owes to the other party is something entirely dif-
ferent from the obligation named in the contract. Why
should the parties ever enter into a contract if the law will
step in and set their contract aside and determine what their
obligations are as if no contract had ever been made?
In United States v. Behan 14 the United States Supreme
Court said:
"The party who voluntarily and wrongfully puts an end to a
contract and prevents the other party from performing it, is estopped
from denying that the injured party has not been damaged to the ex-
tent of his actual loss and outlay fairly incurred."
The Supreme Court then proceeded to compute the plain-
tiff's damages without even considering the value of the de-
fendant's performance. Yet the defendant's performance is
what the plaintiff actually bargained for and is what the
breach has deprived him of. It, the defendant's performance,
is what the plaintiff has actually lost. The Supreme Court
was therefore erroneous in regarding the plaintiff's outlay
as his actual loss; and, in basing the damages upon such out-
lay rather than upon what the plaintiff ought to have re-
ceived, it gave damages to the plaintiff which have no neces-
sary relation to his actual loss. Obviously such a computa-
tion violates the rule that the plaintiff's damages shall be
commensurate with his loss.
Having seen that the basis of the rule as given by the
cases is unsound, an examination of the textbooks discloses
that most writers ignore the problem. Williston, in his work
on Contracts, says that the rule is based upon the theory of
Crecission and restitution." 15 Unquestionably there are
many types of cases to which this doctrine applies. Where
the purchaser breaches the contract, the seller is entitled to
restitution of the land conveyed." In the sale of chattels, if
14 Op. cit. supra note 8.
15 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1459.
16 McClelland v. McClelland, 176 Ill. 83, 51 N. E. 559 (1898); Wilfong v.
Johnson, 41 W. Va. 283, 23 S. E. 730 (1895).
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the purchaser breaches the contract, the seller is entitled to
rescind the contract and keep the goods if they are still in
his possession.17 But where the performance or part per-
formance consists of services and materials a return in specie
is impossible as in the case of land or chattels. Professor
Williston thinks that the reasonable value of part perform-
ance is given as a substitute for this return in specie, and
that the giving of the reasonable value of part performance
is an attempt by the courts to apply the doctrine of "recis-
sion and restitution" to "services and materials" contracts.
We submit that the rule which permits the plaintiff to re-
cover the reasonable value of his part performance of an
express contract, whether based on the theory of "recission
and restitution" or any other theory, is unsound in principle.
When the defendant breaches the contract the plaintiff it,
entitled to be put in as good a position as he would have been
had there been no breach.' 8 This is the generally accepted
rule of damages. The result in the case of Connolly v. Sul-
livan 19 will demonstrate how the recovery of the reasonable
value of the services in quantum meruit may violate this
rule. There the plaintiff agreed to dig a cellar for the de-
fendant for $750. After the plaintiff had dug a part of the
cellar the defendant told him to quit. If the plaintiff is to
be put in as good a position as he would have been had
there been no breach he should receive a proportionate frac-
tion of the contract price plus the profits he has lost. In no
case would his recovery be more than $750. Yet the Massa-
chusetts court, in allowing the plaintiff to recover the rea-
sonable value of his part performance, gave him $1,200 in-
stead of $750 or less. There may be instances in which the.
difference would not be so flagrant, but there is no reason
why the result should be the same. The price agreed upon
in the contract is not necessarily, or even in a majority of
17 UNIFORM SALzS ACT § 61.
18 3 WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 1338.
19 173 Mass. 1, 53 N. E. 143 (1899).
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instances, the reasonable value of the services. The fact that
the defendant could secure the services at less than the rea-
sonable rate may be the very reason why he became a party
to the contract. It is true that in some instances the amount
of recovery will be the same, but the mere possibility that
the reasonable value of the services will be different from the
amount recoverable according to the universal rule shows
that it is erroneous to ever allow the reasonable value to
be the measure of the damages as long as there is a contract
in force.
The case of Connolly v. Sullivan 20 shows that the reason-
able value of part performance will often be greater than
the contract value of full performance. Therefore the recov-
ery of the reasonable value of part performance must violate
the rule established by Hadley v. Baxendale,2' namely, that
the plaintiff is entitled to recover such damages as were rea-
sonably within the contemplation of the parties at the time
the contract was made. If the parties stipulated that the
plaintiff was to be able to recover $750 for full performance
how can they have had the recovery of $1,200 for part per-
formance in mind? It is self-evident that if the parties fix
a certain stipulated price for full performance, it is impos-
sible that they could have contemplated the recovery of a
larger sum for part performance.
It is well-established that the party breaching the contract
is subject to no penalty therefor.22 In the case of Hardy v.
Bern . Lord Kenyon and Buller, J., in commenting on the
rule, said:
"It is apparent to us that the law was made in favor of defendants,
and is highly remedial, calculated to give plaintiffs relief up to the ex-
tent of the damage sustained, and to protect defendants against the
payment of further sums than what is in conscience due..
20 Op. cit. supra note 19.
21 9 Ex. 341 (1854).
22 Ford v. Forgason, 120 Ga. 208, 48 S. E. 180 (1904); Aberdeen v. Honey,
8 Wash. 251, 35 Pac. 1097 (1894).
23 5 T. R. 636, 637 (1794).
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In other words, there is nothing legally reprehensible in a
party's breaching his contract as long as he stands ready
to pay the plaintiff the damages he has actually suffered
and he is subject to no penalty for so doing. But by the
"reasonable value rule," which requires the defendant to
do more than place the plaintiff in as good a position as he
would have been in had there been no breach, the defendant
is compelled to pay a sum over and above and in addition
to the damages which the plaintiff has actually sustained. It,
therefore, effectually places a penalty on the defendant for
breaching his contract and is within the condemnation of
the rule against penalties.
The "reasonable value rule" is condemned by its own ab-
surdity when viewed in the light of other holdings of the
courts on the effect of the defendant's breach. The courts
unanimously agree that when the defendant breaches the ex-
press contract after the plaintiff has fully performed all the
plaintiff is entitled to recover is the price or consideration
stipulated in the contract. 4 This is so whether the plaintiff
sues for damages caused by the breach of the contract or on
a quantum meruit for the value of what he has done. If the
defendant breaches the contract after the plaintiff has fully
performed he is not subject to the penalty of having the
damages measured by the reasonable value rather than by
the contract value. But the "reagonable value rule" does sub-
ject the defendant to such a penalty if he breaches after the
plaintiff has partially performed. The courts must think that
a breach after part performance by the other party is so
such a more serious consequence than a breach after full per-
formance as to justify the imposition of a penalty in the
former instance and not a penalty in the latter. The ab-
surdity of this reasoning is apparent on its face.
From a practical viewpoint, the "reasonable value rule"
is extremely illogical. For illustrative purposes, suppose the
24 Barnett v. Sweringen, 77 Mo. App. 64 (1898); Porter v. Dunn, 131 N. Y.
314, 30 N. E. 122 (1892).
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plaintiff has agreed to do a piece of work for $1,000, which
will reasonably cost him $3,000 to perform. If the defendant
breaches before the plaintiff has started to perform, it is
apparent that the plaintiff can recover no substantial dam-
ages. If the defendant breaches after full performance the
plaintiff is entitled to recover $1,000. Then if the defendant
breaches after the plaintiff has done half the work why
should not the plaintiff recover $500? Mathematical logic
demands this result. If the plaintiff is to get $1,000 for doing
all of the work he should get $500 for doing half of the work
rather than the $1,500, which the "reasonable value rule"
would give him.
It appears, then, that the case of Doolittle & Chamber-
lain v. McCullough laid down the correct rule, namely, that
the plaintiff's damages must be measured by the contract in
the cases in which he has partly performed as well as in the
cases in which he has fully performed. This rule is nothing
more than an application of the general rule that the plain-
tiff is entitled to be put in as good a position as he would have
been in had there been no breach and is, therefore, based on
the inherent justice of limiting the plaintiff's damages to his
actual loss. It is impossible to ascertain whether the modern
trend is towards the adoption of the "reasonable value rule"
or towards the rule of Doolittle & Chamberlain v. McCul-
lough, although there are several very recent cases which
have applied the "reasonable value rule." 25 Regardless of
the trend of current opinion, it is difficult to see how any
rule which is as violative of established legal principles and
as contrary to practical justice as the "reasonable value
rule" can occupy an eternal position in the body of our law.
Louis Jackson.
South Bend, Indiana.
25 Schwasnick v. Blandin, 65 Fed. (2d) 354 (1933); Polak v. Kramer,
116 Conn. 688, 166 At. 396 (1933).
